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18 OCT 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI

FROM : RRB

SUBJECT : Current Intelligence and Crisis Management

1. Action Requested: None; for information only.
2. Background: This is in response to your query concerning the papers attached (Tab A). Actually, the paper on a National Current Intelligence Center is the prospectus for a study later issued by the Center for Intelligence Studies (Tab B). <sup>(H - -)</sup> The CIS paper recommends against such a national center (pp. 29-32.), and I agree with its findings. Such a Center would be torn between national and departmental needs, and no departmental agency would be willing to give its best analysts to such an organization when it needed <sup>especially in crisis</sup> them most for its own purposes; <sup>mandate</sup> your support in crisis must come from <sup>the substitution</sup> your own analysts. <sup>in NFA (See Para 3)</sup> On the other hand, the reorganization last year that eliminated the Office of Current Intelligence, while it achieved its purpose in greatly strengthening our capabilities for political analysis, did result in some weakening of our capabilities for quick and flexible response in crisis. To my mind, the problem now is to ensure that we are able so to respond without reinventing OCI; dedication of  positions for current intelligence is too high a price.

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3. The National Intelligence Tasking Center provides one key element in our crisis capabilities; without it, we have had a period of improvisation in the first few days of every major crisis. When

AT  is in business, there will be a mechanism to handle the coordination of collection in crisis, both to support you directly and to respond to analytic requirements as they develop. I believe, however, that we should keep functional lines of authority clear. We are dealing with a continuum stretch-<sup>ing</sup> from "normal" times to the most intense crisis. Moreover, analysis and production is another sort of

continuum stretching from the current intelligence spot report <sup>to the analytic</sup> ~~current item in the RDB, to the careful response to President's questions~~ long-range study. Looked at either way, the job is to treat the same ~~to the NITC, and to the~~ issues for the same customers using the same kinds of raw information;

it makes sense to use the same analysts as well. In other words, we should not divide the substantive or analytic responsibility in any way, but rather devise procedures to move smoothly from our normal mode to crisis arrangements. This does not mean that we should not form an NFAC task force if the situation requires it, or that such a task force should not work closely with the NITC.

4. What then should we do on the NFAC side? The short history of OCI points out some of the qualities of that organization that made it responsive: high-level attention and access, a trained cadre of analysts, established and generally understood procedures for crisis support to the DCI, responsive supporting and logistic elements. The elimination of OCI removed the web that held these together, but it did not destroy them; <sup>are latent</sup> ~~and~~ they all ~~exist~~ in NFAC today. The analysts in ORPA, OER, and OSR are no less experienced than before. The Operations

Center is stronger than it ever was. The redefinition of Dick Lehman's duties to include current intelligence will provide the senior leadership. It will be his responsibility to ensure that our crisis procedures are in working order, and to work out arrangements with Frank Camm. He has promised me some recommendations in a few weeks on how to get better current intelligence without major changes in organization or resource allocation.

5. In short, I believe we have a sound organization that can meet your needs on the production side. When the NITC is established, we will have the same on the collection side. The important thing is to link them together properly, and I think both Frank and I understand this.

Robert R. Bowie